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ABSTRACT
Recently, security of consumer information in financial institutions
has become more of a concern to consumers alongside financial
institutions. In response, the government has enacted the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act. This Act contains a notable Security Safeguards
Rule. Financial institutions, a term broadly defined in the Act, are
to comply through risk assessment procedures and implementation
of appropriate security measures. A debate exists as to whether
two-factor authentication (1) should be the minimal level of
compliance and (2) whether it is indeed the best solution. While
some may argue that currently it provides a "best" solution, such
a solution is not foolproof. Two-factor authentication may address
issues that arrive through one-factor authentication, such as
password guessing. It is not adequate, however, in addressing the
more active nature of attacks today that occur through phishing
and Trojan horses. Also, two-factor authentication goes beyond
the minimal standards required across a broad scope offinancial
institutions. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is meant to cover
financial institutions with varying levels of appropriate risk
assessment and security measures. A mandate of two-factor
authentication would go beyond the purpose of the Act to
implement minimum standards across a broad scope of financial
institutions. While arguably an effective solution in today's world,
if one that may go beyond minimal compliance, two-factor
authentication is not an end solution as it simply addresses the
passive attacks of yesterday and not the more active attacks of
today and the future.
I. EXISTING LEGISLATION: THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT AND
SECURITY SAFEGUARDS
Security has always been a concern of the federal government.
Only recently, however, has it become a concern for consumers in
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regard to the consumer information kept by financial institutions. In
the electronic and Internet banking worlds of today, these institutions
are easy prey to identity theft if security measures are not in place. To
address these concerns and provide further guidance to financial
institutions as to what is an adequate security system, Congress passed
the Financial Modernization Act of 1999, otherwise known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB"). GLB "regulates the privacy and
protection of customer records maintained by financial institutions."1
The statute sets forth a congressional policy stating that "each
financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to
respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and
confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal information."2
Moreover, the statute gives agencies regulating financial institutions
the responsibility of setting forth appropriate standards. The standards
are to relate to technical, administrative, and physical safeguards for
the following objectives:
1. to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records
and information;
2. to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the
security or integrity of such records; and
3. to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
records or information which could result in substantial harm
or inconvenience to any customer.
GLB defines "financial institution" broadly. Besides banks, the
scope of this term also includes credit unions, credit-card issuing
companies, mortgage loan companies, broker/dealers, and other
institutions that interact with consumers through means of financial
1 Daniel J. Langin, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Security Requirements: Keeping Robbers and
Regulators from the Door, Recourse Technologies at 1 (2002), available at
http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/gramm tech0902.pdf.
2 Financial Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a)
(2005).
15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2005).
[Vol. 2:3
2006]
transactions with them or through providing financial services or
products to them.
4
As a result of GLB, and specifically the security safeguards
requirement section, the requisite agencies issued the "Interagency
Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer
Information," commonly referred to as "the Guidelines."6  The
Guidelines created common standards across financial institutions to
address security issues. A letter from the Federal Reserve System,
dated May 31, 2001, further explained the procedure for examining
compliance, stating that financial institution examiners are required to
"assess compliance with the Guidelines during each safety and
soundness examination cycle (which may include targeted reviews of
information technology) .. . and monitor ongoing compliance as
needed."
7
In total, the Guidelines require "the development and
implementation of security programs that: [i]nvolves the Board of
Directors, [a]ssesses risk, [m]anages and controls risk, [o]versees
service provider arrangements, [a]djusts the program, [r]eports to the
Board, [and] [i]mplements the standards." A violation of these
standards is a serious offense and may result in a daily fine anywhere
from $5,000 to $1,000,000. 9
4 See FTC Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k)(2) (2001).
5 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision and the National Credit Union
Administration. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION
IN AN INTERNET BANKING ENVIRONMENT 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authenticationguidance.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines].
6 Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 66
Fed. Reg. 8616 (Feb. 1, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 30, 208, 211,225,263, 308,
364, 568, 570); see also Langin, supra note 1.
7 Letter from Richard Spillenkothen, Director, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, to The Officer in Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Supervisory and
Examinations Staff at Each Federal Reserve Bank and to Each Domestic Banking
Organization Supervised by the Federal Reserve System (May 31, 2001) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.ffiec.gov/exam/InfoBase/documents/02-frb-privacy-srol-
15(sup)010531.pdf; see also Langin, supra note 1.
8 JAMES WEISSMAN, GLOBAL INFORMATION ASSURANCE CERTIFICATION, MAKING THE CASE FOR
MANAGED SECURITY 5 (2004), available at
http://www.giac.org/certified_professionals/practicals/gsec/3889.php.
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The security breaches of 2005, notably those at data brokers
LexisNexis and ChoicePoint, 1° were strong incentives for the creation
of the Guidelines. The Guidelines set forth "certain affirmative
obligations aimed at protecting sensitive financial information and
notifying customers in the event of a security breach."'" Pursuant to
the GLB Safeguards Rule, the Guidelines were collectively issued by
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC")
agencies. 12 FFLEC agencies issued the updated guidance with the
specific objective to address "why financial institutions regulated by
the agencies should conduct risk-based assessments, evaluate customer
awareness programs, and develop security measures to reliably
authenticate customers remotely accessing their Internet-based
financial services.,
13
An onus is placed on financial institutions to create a strong IT
environment which addresses security issues such as "unauthorized
disclosure of information, misuse of data, and alteration or destruction
of personal data."'14 To accomplish these goals, many financial
institutions created programs that incorporated a strong identity and
access management ("IAM") system.' 5
Single-factor authentication in terms of password-centric security
currently complies with the Guidelines. There is a push, however, for
strong authentication, also known as two-factor authentication, to be
10 Id. (The public only became informed of these breaches due to an existing California law
requiring consumers be notified upon such an event).
11 Examining the Financial Industry's Responsibility to Prevent Identity Theft and Protect
Sensitive Consumer Financial Information: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (1st Sess. 2005) (statement of Ira D. Hammerman,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Securities Industry Association), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/_files/hammerman.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2006); see also
Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736-54 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pts. 30, 208, 225, 364, 568, 570).
12 Guidelines, supra note 5, at 1.
13 Id.
14 Strong User Authentication and Gramm Leach Bliley: Cost-Effective Compliance with Title
VPrivacy Provisions, BIOPASSWORD, Mar. 2004, at 4, available at
http://www.verticalcompany.com/pdfs/BioPassword-Graham%20Leach%2OBliley.pdf.
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the standard in these financial institutions as well as among
consumers. 
16
The FFIEC Guidance has created, in what some believe to be more
a mandate than guidance, that "[s]tarting in January 2007, financial
institutions must provide consumers of online financial services with
the same security protection enjoyed by customers buying groceries or
gas with a debit card: strong authentication.' 17 The specific FFIEC
statement provides: "Where risk assessments indicate that the use of
single-factor authentication is inadequate, financial institutions should
implement multifactor authentication, layered security, or other
controls reasonably calculated to mitigate those risks."'18 As this paper
shall discuss, however, strong authentication is not an end solution.
Further, mandatory implementation of strong authentication goes
beyond the purpose of GLB of applying minimal standards across the
broad scope of companies held to be "financial institutions."
II. ENFORCEMENT OF GLB AND FAILURE OF COMPLIANCE
In order to assess the risks properly and implement appropriate
safeguards, a certain level of compliance must be understood and metby financial institutions. Again, the definition of financial institutions
that must comply with the safeguards is broad. This definition even
stretches to include the automotive industry due to vehicle transaction
financing aspects. A report to the automotive industry recommending
what is necessary for compliance with the GLB Safeguards directs the
industry to
develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive
information security program... [which] must be in writing
and it must be readily accessible . . . [and] must contain
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that are
appropriate to [the] size and complexity [of the financial
16 "Strong means two or more types of identity verification in return for access." See Scott
Berinato, Second Thoughts on Second Factors: Seven Ways in Which a New Strong-
Authentication Standard isn't Quite What It Appears to Be, CSO (Feb. 2006),
http://www.csoonline.con/read/020106/second-thoughts.html.
17 Id. (emphasis added).
"S Guidelines, supra note 5, at 4 (emphasis added).
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institution], the nature and scope of [their] activities, and the
sensitivity of any customer information at issue.19
The report further states that while the Safeguards Rule does
prescribe five essential elements of compliance that financial
institutions must address in a written, comprehensive information
security program, any further identification of "meaningful, concrete
security measures falls to the party with the best access to information
... about risks[]"--the financial institution itself.2
0
Accounting for the fact that different risks may be applicable to
different financial institutions, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
built a level of flexibility into what is required for financial institutions
to comply with the GLB Safeguards. The five required elements the
FTC set forth include the following:
1. Designate an employee or employees to coordinate your
information security program.
2. Identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to
the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer
information that could result in the unauthorized disclosure,
misuse, alteration, destruction or other compromise of such
information, and assess the sufficiency of any safeguards in
place to control these risks. At a minimum, such a risk
assessment should include consideration of risks in each
relevant area of [the financial institution's] operations,
including:
a. Employee training and management;
b. Information systems, including network and
software design, as well as information processing,
storage, transmission, and disposal; and
19 REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS, UPDATE: COMPLYING WITH THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
PRIVACY AND SAFEGUARD RULES 1 (Jan. 2004),
http://www.reyrey.com/GrammLeachBlileyActBrochure.pdf.
20 id.
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c. Detecting, preventing, and responding to attacks,
intrusions, or other system failures.
3. Design and implement information safeguards to control the
risks identified through risk assessment, and regularly test or
otherwise monitor the effectiveness of the safeguard's key
controls, systems, and procedures.
4. Oversee service providers by:
a. Taking reasonable steps to select and retain service
providers that are capable of maintaining appropriate
safeguards for the customer information at issue; and
b. Requiring [by contract that] service providers
implement and maintain such safeguards.
5. Evaluate and adjust [the financial institution's] information
security program in light of the results of the testing and
monitoring required by paragraph (c) of this section; any
material changes to your operations or business
arrangements; or any circumstances that you know or have
reason to know may have a material impact on your
information security program.2'
The report further summarizes these five elements into useful
recommendations. These recommendations are listed below:
1. "Coordinate with your coordinator.,
22
2. Focus on the risks that matter at that particular financial
institution and recall that the Safeguards do not require
21 Id.; see also FTC, Financial Institutions and Customer Data: Complying with the Safeguards
Rule, FTC FACTS FOR BUSINESS, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/
safeguards.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2006) [hereinafter FTC FACTS FOR BUSINESS].
22 REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS, supra note 19, at 1.
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mitigation of remote risks but do require reasonably assessed
ones.
23
3. Maximize efficiency of your safeguards contract by
minimizing risk of duplicate contracts of this nature in the
financial institution, perhaps by designating one person to
receive copies from all departments of safeguards
contracts.24
4. "Keep pace; ' 25 as the FTC states, "[b]ecause of the ever-
changing nature of the relevant risks, however, the
Commission does not find it appropriate to delineate risks
more specifically within the Rule. 26
As to the final point regarding compliance with the Safeguards,
assessing and focusing on current risks is not enough. The financial
institutions must keep up to date with the ever changing world of risks
and intercept these risks in order to maintain compliance. Security
measures must address current issues and also be able to address
evolving issues for the future because "[a] slow reaction to changing
vulnerabilities will widen the window of opportunity for a successful
attack.
27
A. GLB ENFORCEMENT AGAINST NATIONWIDE AND SUNBELT
In the fall of 2004, the FTC conducted a nationwide compliance
sweep that resulted in the formal charging of two mortgage companies,
both falling under the GLB definition of "financial institutions."
These two companies, Nationwide Mortgage Group, Inc.
23 Id.
24Id. at2.
25 Id.
26 Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information: Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,489, 36,489
(May 23, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 314), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/O5/67fr36585.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2006); see also FTC
FACTS FOR BusINEss, supra note 21.
27 REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS, supra note 19, at 2.
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("Nationwide") and Sunbelt Lending Services, Inc. ("Sunbelt"), were
the first companies that the FTC enforced the Safeguards Rule
against.
2 8
The FTC alleged that Nationwide and its President, John D.
Eubank, had "failed to implement safeguards to protect.., customers'
names, social security numbers, credit histories, bank account
numbers, income tax returns, ax:d other sensitive financial
information., 29  Mainly, Nationwide failed to employ training on
Internet security, oversee how customer information was handled by
its loan officers, and to make sure to catch vulnerabilities in its
computer network through proper monitoring techniques. Sunbelt
faced similar charges as it "also failed to oversee the security practices
of its service providers and of its loan officers" and agreed to settle
with the FTC with an agreement barring future Safeguards Rule
violations and a requirement of biannual audits of the information
security program at Sunbelt for ten years by a qualified and
independent professional. 30  Nationwide, too, agreed to settlement
terms to not violate the GLB Act any further, and to utilize "a
qualified, objective, independent third-party professional, using
procedures and standards generally accepted in the profession, within
one hundred and eighty (180) days after service of the order, and
biennially thereafter for ten (10) years after service of the order.",3 1
Guidelines would be set forth for Nationwide to implement, follow,
and assess for compliance purposes according to Nationwide's size
and complexity. Nationwide would also be responsible to uphold
assurances that the program operates in such a manner that "the
security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information is
protected.
3 2
As a result of the initial sweep, the FTC declared that both
companies had failed to comply with the Safeguards Rule's basic
requirements. More specifically, they did not "assess risks to sensitive
28 Press Release, FTC, FTC Enforces Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's Safeguards Rule Against
Mortgage Companies (Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/11/ns.htm.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Nationwide Mortgage Group, No. 9319, 2005 F.T.C. LEXIS 55, at *3 (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9319/050415dod9319.pdf.
32 id.
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customer information [and] implement safeguards to control these
risks."33 Guidance had been available for the companies to consult in
order to determine how to comply properly with GLB Safeguards
Rule.
The FFIEC Guidance ("[c]onsistent with the FFIEC Information
Technology Examination Handbook, Information Security Booklet,
December 2002") includes a risk assessment process. In this section,
they communicate three points of the process:
* Identify all transactions and levels of access
associated with Internet-based customer products
and services;
* Identify and assess the risk mitigation techniques,
including authentication methodologies, employed
for each transaction type and level of access; and
* Include the ability to gauge the effectiveness of risk
mitigation techniques for current and changing risk
factors for each transaction type and level of
access.
34
The FFIEC communicated to examiners how to conduct
inspections in the various fields to maintain a level of consistency.
While examiners do not require two-factor authentication to be in
place (as the guidances are risk-based rather than technology specific),
they do look at a combination of how financial institutions address the
interplay of risks, their customer preferences, and the market.35
However, the FFIEC has not yet taken a firm position on what exact
33 Posting of Camelia Mazard, FTC Consumer Protection Highlights to Antitrust Law Blog,
http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/highlights-84-ftc-consumer-protection-highlights.html (Mar.
8, 2005).
34 Guidelines, supra note 5, at 2, 4.
35 Interview with John Carlson, Senior Director, BITS, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 19, 2006)
(on file with author).
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type of security, front-end or back-end, should be implemented by
financial institutions.
36
III. PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION AND STATE INITIATIVES
A wide variety of proposed legislation addressing security in the
information age has been put forth, especially in response to many of
the security breaches which occurred over the past year, such as
breaches at data brokers ChoicePoint and LexisNexis. Most notably,
one of these is the Information Protection and Security Act, S. 500 and
H.R. 1080 of the 109th Congress. 37 This legislation, proposed by Sen.
Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) and Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), would
regulate data brokers.38 Groups such as the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group ("PIRG") take a strong interest in the passage of this
Act as it would impose "Fair Information Practices (FIPs) based rules
on information brokers, [allow] consumers to enforce the law and
[allow] states to continue to enact stronger laws." 39
States have been active in their legislative reform regarding the
privacy and security issue. California itself has taken strong action
since 1999 through forty new privacy initiatives.40  Indeed, Sen.
Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) proposed as recently as April 2005 a more
tightened, stricter version of her ID Notification bill, which would
close loopholes found in S.B. 1386, or rather, California's notification
law.4
1
In fact, only through California's enactment of security breach
disclosure legislation was the ChoicePoint loss of information even
discovered by consumers (through required consumer notification
36 Isabelle Lindenmayer, FFIEC Advisory Reopens An Old Security Debate, AM. BANKER 6-9,
Oct. 31, 2005, available at
http://www.netbankaudit.com/images/AmericanBanker on Authentication.pdf.
3' H.R. 1080, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 500, 109th Cong. (2005).
38 Lisa Vaas, Two-Factor Authentication Could Stem Rising Tide of Identity Theft,
EWEEK.COM, Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1787134,00.asp.
39 Letter from PIRG to Senator Nelson and Representative Markey (Mar. 8, 2005),
http://www.pirg.org/consumer/pdfs/pirgendorsesnelsomnarkey.pdf.
40 Gwen Kennedy, Thumbs Up for Biometric Authentication!, 8 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 379,
396 n.73 (2004).
41 See Vaas, supra note 38.
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upon the loss of their information).42 After this security breach, PIRG
noted that "a dozen states or more are now considering security breach
proposals, security freeze proposals (which allow consumers to
'freeze' access to their reports to new users, and have already been
enacted in California, Texas, Louisiana and Vermont) and other
reforms."43  However, while California and Texas enacted laws
covering all consumers, Louisiana and Vermont only enacted the laws
for identity theft victims. After the ChoicePoint and LexisNexis
security breaches, which again the public was informed of only as a
result of the California law, over twenty-seven states in 2005 ended up
filing state security freeze bills, while California and Texas went on to
further file bills which would strengthen their existing laws. 4
4
State action is proceeding quickly on the issue, as seen in the more
than doubling of states with enacted security freeze laws alone within
the first months of 2006. In an update posted January 4, 2006, the
PIRG reported that "there are now a total of twelve states with laws
allowing consumers to restrict access to their credit reports. 'A5 The
states with enacted security freeze laws for all consumers included
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New
Jersey, and North Carolina.46 The states with enacted security freeze
42 Letter from PIRG to Senator Nelson and Representative Markey, supra note 39.
43 Id.; see also the PIRG/Consumers Union State Model Identity Theft Law, The State Clean
Credit and Identity Theft Protection Act, available at
http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/model.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
44 Identity Theft Shenanigans Cloud End of Legislative Session, THE AKPIRG ADVOCATE,
June 2006, http://www.akpirg.org/Publications/Newsletters/June2006newsletter.pdf; see
generally State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Notification Laws, Update as of
July 18, 2006, http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
45 THE AKPIRG ADVOCATE, supra note 44, at 3.
46 State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Notification Laws, supra note 44. See
also Oversight Hearing on Data Security, Data Breach Notices, Privacy and Identity Theft:
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong., 23 (2005)
(testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups on Security Breaches and Privacy, Edmund
Mierzwinski, U.S. PIRG Consumer Program Director) ("The New Jersey General Assembly
has passed what will be the strongest freeze law in the country. The bill allows all consumers
to use the security freeze tool at a minimal cost and requires the credit bureaus to facilitate the
quick placement and lifting of the freeze."); California (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.10-1785.19.5
(Deering 2003)), Colorado (Sen Bill 05-137; available at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/Clics2005a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/349195C4D 17F 1A7787256F8E0001
202B?Open&file=1 37_enr.pdf), Connecticut (2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 148), Louisiana (2004
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laws for identity theft victims rather than all consumers included
Illinois, Vermont, Texas, and Washington (where Washington further
includes victims of security breaches). 47 Moreover, the PIRG stated
that other bills still to pass during the year were being considered in
California, Delaware, Maine, Michigan, New York, and Oregon.48
On July 18, 2006, the PIRG updated its information on state
legislation of security freeze and security breach notification laws.
49
In the first half of 2006, the number of states giving the right to a
security freeze to all state residents increased from eight to twenty.
50
Of the other four states, which had simply provided security freeze
rights to identity theft victims as of January 2006, two of those states,
Vermont and Illinois, have now expanded the right to all consumers.
51
Additional states to enact security freeze laws for identity theft victims
alone are Hawaii, Kansas, and South Dakota.
5 2
In total, as of July 18, 2006, "[twenty-five] states have enacted
legislation that either already grants or will soon give all or some
consumers the right to prevent identity theft by placing a security
freeze on their credit reports."53  Within the first half of 2006, the
amount of states with security freeze laws more than doubled from
twelve to twenty-five states.
La. Acts 766), Maine (LD 581), Nevada (2005 Nev. Stat. 391), New Jersey (2005 N.J. Laws
226), North Carolina (2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 414).
47 State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Notification Laws, supra note 44 (Illinois
(2005 Ill. Laws 74), Vermont (2004 Vt. Acts & Resolves 155), Texas (2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
1326), and Washington (2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 342)).
48 Id. (States to have considered security freeze bills in 2005 include: Arkansas, California,
Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
South Carolina, and Utah).
49 State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Notification Laws, supra note 44.
5 0 Id. (Additional states to the initial eight providing the security freeze right to all consumers
now include Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin).
51 Id.
52 id
53id.
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Other security bills were considered and enacted over 2005 as
well, such as the security breach notification laws introduced in at least
thirty-five states and enacted in twenty-three states.54 As of July 18,
2006, within the first half of 2006, the PIRG reports "at least [thirty-
four] states have passed security breach notification laws." 55
Additionally, in the spirit of enhanced security measures, some state
legislatures have considered bills specifically dealing with biometric
information sharing, such as those in California,56 New Jersey,57 and
Massachusetts. 58 These bills would regulate biometric information
collection and distribution through means of a consumer consent
requirement and a restriction on disclosure to certain third parties for
purposes other than identification.
59
Concerns over security breaches have gone beyond financial
institutions to the consumers they serve. Many financial institutions
may be heading towards two-factor authentication on their own to
guarantee stronger compliance with the Guidelines. Yet John Carlson,
54 State PIRG Summary, supra note 44, (Arkansas: Act 1526, available at
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ftproot/acts/2005/public/act 1526.pdf, California (CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.29, 1798.82-1798.84 (Deering 2005), Connecticut (2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 148),
Delaware (75 Del. Laws 61 (2005)), Illinois (2005 Ill. Laws 36), Louisiana (2005 La. Acts
499), Minnesota (2005 Minn. Laws 167), Montana (2005 Mont. Laws 518), Nevada (2005
Nev. Stat. 485), New Jersey (2005 N.J. Laws 226), New York (2005 N.Y. Laws 491), North
Carolina (2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 414), North Dakota (2005 N.D. Laws 447), Ohio (2005 HB
104), Pennsylvania (2005 Pa. Laws 94), Rhode Island (2005 R.I. Pub. Laws 225), Tennessee
(security notification: H.B. 2178, S.B. 2227- but taken off committees; security freeze: H.B.
2480, filed for intro on Jan. 12, 2006), and the following other states: Washington, Florida and
Texas); Applying to data brokers only: Georgia (2005 Ga. Laws 163); Applying to state
agencies only: Indiana (2005 Ind. Acts 91); Applying to Information brokers only: Maine
(2005 Me. Laws 379)).
55 State PIRG Summary, supra note 44, (Additional states enacting security breach notification
laws in 2006 include: Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma (state agencies only), Utah, and Wisconsin).
56 S.B. 71, 1999-00 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (the bill failed in the Judiciary Committee).
57 The Biometric Identifier Privacy Act, AB 2448, Leg., 210th Sess. (passed in the Assembly,
September 23, 2002, received in the Senate, and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
September 26, 2002).
" H.B. 4483, 1 81 t Gen. Ct., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999) (the bill passed just one house).
59 Kennedy, supra note 40, at 395-97.
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Senior Director of BITS,60 notes, "It's easy to apply two-factor
authentication when you have employees [or a government mandate].
... But it's a highly different equation when you deal with customers
that can choose between different financial institutions."' 1 Further, as
Carlson has recently stated, "Based on a survey of BITS members in
February 2005, the primary issue with two-factor is consumer
acceptance/ease of use followed by cost, and technology issues (e.g.,
integration with existing IT systems). 62
IV. TwO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION AS A CONSUMER SOLUTION
AGAINST SECURITY BREACHES WITHIN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Two-factor authentication is mainly referred to regarding the use
of "a small, digital token device to provide users with a random, six-
digit code that changes every [sixty] seconds." 63 In order to access
sites, for instance, online banking accounts, the user will use this
unique code in combination with her user ID and password.64
A debate exists as to whether two-factor authentication is truly the
key to solving the problem of identity theft, a problem greatly
troubling both financial institutions and the consumers they serve.
While many believe it to be the key, others are not so optimistic. As
John Carlson states, "[t]wo factor can be a helpful tool. I would not go
so far as to say it's the best solution. It has [to] be viewed in the
context of entire information security program of a financial institution
and the 'customer experience.'
65
Similarly, some such as Howard Schmidt, former special advisor
to the President for cyber-space security, see two-factor authentication
as a possible solution, but not the best one.66 Schmidt believes that,
60 Interview with John Carlson, supra note 35. John Carlson was also one of the authors of the
GLB Guidelines for Safeguarding Customer Information.
61 See Vaas, supra note 38.
62 Interview with John Carlson, supra note 35.
63 See Vaas, supra note 38.
64id.
65 Interview with John Carlson, supra note 35.
66 Vaas, supra note 38.
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rather than new laws, the solution would be to increase the amount of
law enforcement personnel. Schmidt views two-factor authentication
as only helping to reduce the number of victims, and not helping to
stem the problem in the same manner that resources in law
enforcement would (which, according to Schmidt, is what is actually
needed). 67
Bruce Schneier represents another voice on the issue. Schneier, an
internationally renowned security technologist and author, wrote an
essay depicting two-factor authentication as an outdated solution not
capable of solving the problems existing in security today.68 Schneier
explains that the problem with passwords, and why many are pushing
forward two-factor authentication rather than a single-factor
authentication password method, is that they are easy to forget or
lose.69 Schneier does admit that two-factor authentication mitigates
this problem; however, another problem exists as the nature of the
attacks over the last decade has shifted from passive to active. Rather
than simply being concerned with passive eavesdropping and offline
password guessing, consumers and financial institutions of today are
more concerned about active attacks in the form of phishing and
Trojan horses.7 °
Phishing occurs through consumer fraud. For instance, a
perpetrator will create a false website imitating a real bank's website
in order to entice a user to type in her password so that the perpetrator
can use it at the actual bank website. The user is unaware of the fraud
and is either disconnected or passed on to the actual bank website to
conduct a real transaction simultaneously with the perpetrator's
fraudulent one. 7
1
Trojan horses, rather, follow a different course. First, the
perpetrator installs a Trojan on the user's computer. From then on,
67 id.
68 Schneier on Security, The Failure of Two-Factor Authentication,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/thefailureof.html (Mar. 15, 2005) ("It
won't defend against phishing. It's not going to prevent identity theft. It's not going to secure
online accounts from fraudulent transactions. It solves the security problems we had ten years
ago, not the security problems we have today.").
69 See id.
70 Id.
[Vol. 2:3
SINGH
upon user login at an actual bank website, the perpetrator may
"piggyback" on the session in order to gain access to the user accounts
so that fraudulent transactions might be made.72
Schneier, after laying out these new, "active" security concerns,
describes how two-factor authentication will not solve these new
problems. Schneier states that "[i]n the first case [of phishing], the
attacker can pass the ever-changing part of the password to the bank
along with the never-changing part. And in the second case [of Trojan
horses], the attacker is relying on the user to log in."73 He concludes
with stating that the only true effect of two-factor authentication in
addressing these security concerns would be to force criminals to
modify their strategies. In his view, two-factor authentication will not
be useless for those initial adopters of strong authentication (during the
period the criminals are being forced to modify their behavior), for
local logins, and with some corporate networks. Schneier does
believe, however, that two-factor authentication will be useless for
remote authentication over the Internet.74
In contrast, there are still those who believe the opposite, that two-
factor authentication will not only play a role, but will play a strong
one in cyber-security. One of those holding this belief is John
McNulty, as he notes in his article responding to Schneier's essay.75
While noting that Schneier's essay did address valid concerns in the
banking IT security community, McNulty stated that he would not
share Schneier's view of two-factor authentication being a failure
rather than a solution. McNulty stresses that two-factor authentication
addresses the serious concern of the vulnerability presented by
traditionally fixed passwords, easily lost or stolen. Two-factor
authentication is stated to be more secure simply as it requires two
factors: "typically a PIN and a device such as a hardware token, which
together generate a unique one-time-only passcode. 76 McNulty states
that this will foil password theft as, a point on which Schneier agrees
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Schneier on Security, supra note 68.
75 John McNulty, Two-Factor Authentication is Still Strong, EWEEK.COM, Apr. 11, 2005,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1 78 24 35,00.asp.
76 John McNulty, News and Product Updates: Knock-Knock... Who's There?, SECURE
COMPUTING, May/June 2005, http://www.securecomputing.con/index.cfm?skey-1428.
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as well, the intercepted password will not be good for the next login.77
However, what McNulty fails to truly address and consider is the fact
that criminals are active in today's world, continuously strategizing
and generating methods to overcome such foils in their ever ongoing
pursuit of identity theft.
Of particular interest, McNulty does not further address the
Schneier explanation of why two-factor authentication still does not
solve part of the phishing problem. Through phishing, during a
transaction the attacker can still pass both parts of the password, the
ever-changing and never-changing parts, to the bank. Moreover,
McNulty responds to the concern of vulnerability of two-factor
authentication to the more active cyber-security issues of the day,
arising from the phishing and Trojan horse schemes Schneier outlines.
His response, however, is simply that two-factor authentication will
actually lead attackers to search for softer targets.78 McNulty does not
seem to consider that attackers might modify their strategic behavior.
Rather, he appears to believe that the attackers will give up and move
to targets which are not using the two-factor authentication approach.
Further, to support his argument, and apparently weaken Schneier's,
McNulty rests upon the fact that, for two decades, thousands of
security conscious companies have successfully been using two-factor
authentication in order to prevent identity thieves in action.79 The key
issue that McNulty bypasses, however, is Schneier's statement that
two-factor authentication would solve the more passive cyber-security
concerns of a decade past and not the more active ones we are facing
in the present and in the future.
Two-factor authentication as a solution, or even the best solution,
to attacks on consumer information is highly debated in today's world.
One thing that both sides of the debate do appear to agree upon is that
no security tool or system is foolproof.8° Further, an arguable "best"
solution of today may not be the "best" solution of tomorrow as
attackers are constantly working to modify their strategies.
77 McNulty, supra note 75.
78 Id.
79 Id.
[Vol. 2:3
SINGH
V. CONCLUSION
Two-factor authentication, though currently a useful tool for many
financial institutions, will soon be facing the same level of cyber-
security breach concern associated with single-factor, or rather
password, authentication. Furthermore, while it has proven to be
useful in some capacity, it will not be a useful tool for the remote user
looking to improve cyber-security when conducting such business,
such as online banking. In this ever-changing world of security risk,
financial institutions will need to enact security programs to adapt to
the more active risks of today to protect sensitive customer
information. Financial institutions will need to provide consumers
adept security measures to counteract those risks.
Unfortunately, the currently recommended tool of two-factor
authentication appears to have reached its sunset as it is only truly
capable of adequately addressing those passive security risks of days
past. Simultaneously, however, legislation is finally being enacted to
enforce security in financial institutions at a statewide level and to
notify consumers of such security breaches. The awareness that
should arise in the public as a course of this legislation should provide
enough of a push for the financial institutions to continually adapt their
security programs. This push will advance them to meet the risks of
the days to come rather than settle into a comfortable pattern of
minimal compliance. Without such a push, financial institutions may
be satisfied in achieving minimal compliance with the GLB
Safeguards Rule of today and then rest on meeting the demands of
tomorrow. Hopefully, public awareness will not allow the sun to set
on advancements in security improvements simply because some
believe an end solution already exists in the form of two-factor
authentication.
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